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Summary
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
accident and incident data were examined for three types of operations (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) Part 121, Part 135 Scheduled, and Part 135 Nonscheduled) for the years 1988 to 2003- In this time
period, between 15 and 22 percent of commercial accidents and between 58 and 70 percent of commercial
incidents involved a failure or malfunction of some system or component. Accidents involving
system/component failures.!malfunctions (SCFM) were most likely to result in substantial aircraft
damage. Less than 25 percent of SCFM incidents in Part 121 or Scheduled Part 135 resulted in any
damage, but more than 50 percent of Nonscheduled Part 135 SCFM incidents resulted in some aircraft
damage.
Engine and landing gear failures or malfunctions dominate both accidents and incidents, with those
two systems accounting for between 48 and 77 percent of all SCFM accidents and incidents. Among Part
121 accidents and incidents, failures and malfunctions have been more frequent in the engine than in
landing gear, but among Part 135 incidents, landing gear malfunctions occur red more often. No other
system accounted for more than 10 percent of the failure and/or malfunction accidents or incidents.
The Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) technology research plan mapped the Joint
Planning and Development Office's Research and Development Plan (R&D) as well as the National
Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP). The R&D cites two applied research areas that relate to IVHM,
while the NASSP contains five objectives, nine strategies, and twelve tasks that impact IVHM
technologies research.
Future directions in aviation technology as related to IVHM were identified via the review of papers
from three conferences and have been compiled in the technology areas of propulsion, aeronautics, and
aircraft.
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Current and future directions of IVHM-related technologies were identified through the survey of
literature, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program prognostic health management system documents, Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) advanced sensor development for health monitoring documents, and Boeing
IVHM-technology-focused documents. The resulting technologies were classified into 8 categories with a
total of 34 current or emerging IVHM technologies.
1.0 Introduction
	
1.1	 Purpose of Study
NASA's Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is one of four projects within the
Agency's Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD).
The IVHM Project, which was updated August 14, 2008, conducts research to develop validated tools and
technologies for automated detection, diagnosis, and prognosis to mitigate adverse events during flight.
Adverse events include those that arise from system, subsystem, or component faults or failures due to
damage, degradation, or environmental hazards that occur during flight (Ref. 1).
The purpose of this study is to review statistical data and literature from academia, industry, and other
Government agencies to establish requirements for future work in detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and
mitigation for IVHM-related hardware and software. This study is considered a "waypoint" with the
following expected outcomes (Ref. 1):
(1) Report and document the incidents and accidents related to IVHM utilizing the most current
statistical and prognostic data available from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing (ASIAS) Project.
(2) Document and use data such as true and false positive rates for detection and diagnosis from the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program and other relevant programs.
(3) Complete a focused assessment of the potential impact of Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) Research and Development Plan (R&D)/Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) plans on IVHM.
(4) Document reports by subject matter experts on future directions in IVHM research areas.
(5) Assess future directions in aviation technology as related to IVHM topics through a report
documenting the trends according to at least three conferences.
The results of this study are considered a "key decision point" to establish future requirements for the
proj ect.
	
1.2	 Overview of Study Contents
The expected outcomes for this study are addressed in sequential order. Outcome 1 is addressed first and
contains statistical analyses of accident and incident data; these analyses have been conducted by NASA
researchers for this "key decision point." Outcome 2 is summarized by the plan of the JSF Program for
future IVHM data collecting. Outcome 3 is focused on a summary of aviation priority lists including
information from the JDPO. Future trends in IVHM-related technologies address Outcome 4, while future
directions in aviation technology, Outcome 5, follow. Finally, discussion and the conclusions are
provided.
2.0 NASA Statistical Analyses
The first expected outcome of this study is a report that documents the results of an examination of
the most recent statistical and..-or prognostic incident and accident data that is available to determine the
significance of system or component failures and/or malfunctions in U.S. commercial aviation accidents
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and incidents. This section contains the results of a statistical analysis that has been conducted by NASA
to address this expected outcome.
2.1	 NASA Analysis of National Transportation Safety Board and Federal Aviation
Administration Accident and Incident Data
A statistical analysis was conducted to examine the safety risk associated with failures or
malfunctions of the various systems or components of commercial aircraft during 1988 to 2003. In this
analysis, "con- mercial" is defined as Part 121, Scheduled Part 135 and Nonscheduled Part 135 flights.
Part 121 operations applies to major airlines and cargo carriers that fly large, transport-category aircraft,
while Part 135 applies to commercial aircraft air carriers commonly referred to as commuter airlines.
Prior to March 1997, Part 121 operations included aircraft with 30 or more seats. In March 1997, the
definition of Part 121 operations changed and now includes those aircraft with 10 or more seats.
Scheduled operation refers to "any common carriage passenger-carrying operation for compensation or
hire conducted by an air carrier or commercial operator for which the certificate holder or its
representative offers in advance the departure location, departure time, and arrival location." A
nonscheduled operation refers to "any operation for compensation or hire in which the departure time,
departure location, and arrival location are specifically negotiated with the customer" (Ref. 2).
Nonimpact fires were included as a type of malfunction, even when the cause of the fire was not
specified. The safety risk is based on both accidents and incidents, which are defined as follows (Ref. 3):
Accident	 an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place between the
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the
aircraft receives substantial damage
Incident	 an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which
affects or could affect the safety of operations
The source for accident data is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident
and Incident Data System, while the source for incident data is the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Accident/Incident Data System. Although both databases contain both accident and incident data,
the FAA has primary investigative responsibility for incidents, and the NTSB is the authority for accident
investigation.
Data for total flight hours per year were obtained from tables published by the NTSB, which they
created based on data from the FAA. The abbreviation SCFM will be used throughout this report to mean
system/ component failure.%malfunction.
A summary of the SCFM events can be found in Table I. Between 15 and 22 percent of commercial
accidents during 1988 to 2003 involved a failure or malfunction of some system or component. The
lowest proportion of accidents, fatal accidents, and total fatalities associated with SCFM was among
Scheduled Part 135 accidents (10 to 16 percent). In Part 121 flights, SCFM accounted for 18 percent of all
accidents, 27 percent of fatal accidents, and 36 percent of fatalities. In Nonscheduled Part 135 flights,
SCFM accounted for 21 percent of all accidents, 17 percent of fatal accidents, and 17 percent of all
fatalities. Roughly 15 to 20 percent of all SCFM accidents included at least one fatality.
Between 58 and 70 percent of all incidents were caused by failures or malfunctions of some system or
component. Despite having the lowest percentage of SCFM accidents among the three operation
categories, Scheduled Part 135 flights had the highest percentage of SCFM incidents. Nonscheduled Part
135 flights had the highest percentage of accidents and the lowest percentage of incidents related to
SCFM.
In Part 121 flights, 21 failures or malfunctions occurred for each 1 million flight hours; the rate was
even higher among Part 135 flights.
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TABLE I.-SUMMARY OF SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Type of event
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 Nonscheduled Part 135
Total flight hours
Total accidents
232.868,640 25.050,928 46,350,000
600 213 1070
Accidents with SCFM 109 (18.2%) 33 (15.5%) 228(21.3%)
SCFM accidents per million flight hours 0.468 1.317 4.919
Fatal accidents 60 49 278
Fatal accidents with SCFM 16(26.7%) 5(10.2%) 47(16.9%)
Total fatalities 2151 328 664
Fatalities in accidents with SCFM 777(36.1%) 52(15.9%) 109(16.4%)
Total incidents 7497 2218 2081
Incidents with SCFM 4957 (66.1%) 1557 (70.2%) 1218 (58.5%)
SCFM incidents per million flight hours 21.29 62.15 26.28
Each flight operation category has a different phase of flight in which failures or malfunctions are
most likely to occur (see Table II). In Part 121, SCFM is most likely to occur during takeoff (23 percent),
whereas in Scheduled Part 135, takeoff (24 percent) runs a close second to the landing phase (27 percent),
and in Nonscheduled Part 135, SCFM occurs less often in both takeoff (20 percent) and landing (22
percent) phases than in cruise flight (31 percent). Among Scheduled Part 135 accidents, the landing and
takeoff phases accounted for more than half of the failures or malfunctions. In Part 121, the largest
percentage of SCFM occurred during takeoff (23 percent), but 17.5 percent of the SCFM occurred while
the aircraft was standing or during taxi, which is more than 10 percentage points higher than in Part 135.
A large percentage (26 to 32 percent) of incidents, on the other hand, occurred during cruise flight,
regardless of the flight category. In Part 121 and Scheduled Part 135 incidents, the takeoff phase was the
second most common phase for failures or malfunctions, but in Nonscheduled Part 135 incidents, nearly
as many SCFM incidents occurred during the landing phase as in cruise flight.
TABLE II.-PHASE OF FLIGHT FOR SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Accidents or incidents Phase of flight
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled Part
135
Accidents Total accidents 109 33 228
Standing 9(8.3%) 1(3.0%) 0
Taxi 10(9.2%) 1(3.0%) 8(3.5%)
Takeoff 25(22.9%) 8(24.2%) 45(19.7%)
Climb 15 (13.8%) 3(9.1%) 21(9.2%)
Cruise 13(11.9%) 4(12.1%) 70(30.7%)
Descent 6(5.5%) 5(15.2%) 6(2.6%)
Approach 12(11.0%) 2(6.1%) 28(12.3%)
Landing 19(17.4%) 9(27.3%) 50(21.9%)
Incidents Total incidents 4957 1557 1218
Standing 58(l.2%) 14(0.9%) 11(0.9%)
Taxi 293 (5.9%) 93 (6.0%) 70(5.8%)
Takeoff 941(19.0%) 320(20.6%) 126(10.3%)
Climb 807(16.3%) 206(13.2%) 117(9.6%)
Cruise 1568 31.6% 408(26.2%) 360(29.6%)
Descent 363(7.3%) 106(6.8%) 70(5.7%)
Approach 580(11.7%) 219(14.1%) 104(8.5%)
Landing 331(6.7%) 189(12.1%) 355(29.1%)
Unknown 16(0.3%) 2(0.1%) 5(0.4%)
Accidents invoking SCFM were most likely to result in substantial aircraft damage (see Table III).
However, it was not possible to determine from these data whether the most damage was done by the
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malfunction itself (e.g., an uncontained engine failure) or by some later event in the landing sequence
(e.g., a hard landing, wing strike, or collision with terrain during an off-airport landing).
Less than 25 percent of SCFM incidents in Part 121 or Scheduled Part 135 resulted in any damage,
but more than 50 percent of Nonscheduled Part 135 SCFM incidents resulted in some aircraft damage.
TABLE III.—AIRCRAFT DAMAGE IN SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Accidents or
incidents Aircraft damage
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled Part
135
Accidents Total accidents 109 33 228
Destroyed 17 (15.6%) 5(15.2%) 51(22.4%)
Substantial dainage 68 (62.4%) 26(78.8%) 177(77.6%)
Minor damage 9(8.3%) 2 (6.1%) 0
No damage 15 (13.8%) 0 0
Incidents Total incidents 4957 1557 1218
Destroyed 0 0 2(0.2%)
Substantial damage 37(0.7%) 3(0.2%) 8(0.7%)
Minor damage 1081 (21.8%) 364(23.4%) 638(52.4%)
No damage 3822 (77.1%) 1186 (76.2%) 568(46.6%)
Unknown 17(0.3%) 4(0.3%) 2(0.2%)
The consequences of the failures or malfunctions were categorized into four groups (see Table IV).
Some accidents occurred while the aircraft was on the ground (standing, taxi, takeoff roll, or landing roll),
and no other occurrences except aircraft evacuation were noted. In other events, an uneventful landing or
aborted takeoff was made with no further damaging occurrence. Loss of control with resulting ground
collision followed some malfunctions. In some cases (particularly with autopilot malfunctions), control
was regained and an emergency landing was made. In the final group, a precautionary landing was
attempted, but was complicated by some other event that could not be characterized as in-flight loss of
control. These events included hard landings, overruns, wing strikes, collisions with trees while
maneuvering for landing, and encounters with unsuitable terrain during off-airport landings.
The lack of detailed information in the incident database made it impossible to create this type of
table for the incident data.
TABLE IV.—CONSEQUENCES OF SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Consequence of event OperationPart 121 Scheduled Part 135 Nonscheduled Pail 135
Total SCFM accidents 109
39(35.8%)
33 228
27(11.8%)On ground at time of event 6(18.2%)
Uneventful landing 32 (29.4%) 4(12.19/6) 13(5.7%)
In-flight loss of control 13(11.9%)
25(22.9%)
4(12.1%)
19(57.6%)
26(11.4%)
162(71.1%)Complicated
In Part 121 accidents, 65 percent of the failures or malfunctions either occurred while the aircraft was
on the ground or resulted in an uneventful landing. In Part 135 accidents, 58 to 71 percent of the failures
or malfunctions resulted in a complicated landing. In-flight loss of control after or as a consequence of the
SCFM occurred in about 12 percent of the SCFM events, regardless of flight category.
NASA/TM-2010-215808
For each accident and incident, the system affected by the malfunction or failure was determined (see
Table V). In some events multiple systems were affected, and in these cases the first system affected was
selected. For example, if an electrical malfunction preceded an engine fire, that event was categorized
under Electrical.
TABLE V.-SYSTEM AFFECTED BY FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Accidents or
incidents System Part L1
Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled
Part 135
Accidents Total accidents
Electrical
109 33 228
8(7.3%) 1(3.0%) 12(5.3%)
Engine 36(33.0%) 12(36.4%) 111(48.7%)
Flight control 10(9.2%) 3(9.1%) 9(3.9%)
Fuel 4(3.7%) 3(9.1%) 13(5.7%)
Hydraulic 9(8.3%) 2(6.1%) 7(3.1%)
Instrumentation/conununication/navigation 5(4.6%) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%)
Landing ear 23(21.1%) 10(30.3%) 64(28.1%)
Structure 5(4.6%) 1(3.0%) 7(3.1%)
Other 8(7.3%) 1(3.0%) 4(l.8%)
Unknown 1 (0.9%) 0(0.0%) 1(0.4%)
Incidents Total incidents 4957 1557 1218
Electrical 191(3.9%) 64(4.1%) 47(3.9%)
Engine 1384 (27.9%) 486(31.2%) 349(28.7%)
Comfort systems 246(5.0%) 54(3.5%) 20(l.6%)
Flight control 431(8.7%) 43(2.8%) 28(2.3%)
Fuel 215(4.3%) 80(5.1%) 54(4.4%)
Hydraulic 414(8.4%) 57(3.7%) 45(3.7%)
Instrumentation/communication/navigation 83(l.7%) 34(2.2%) 13(l.1%)
Landing gear 990(20.0%) 509(32.7%) 558(45.8%)
Pressurization 174(3.5%) 15(l.0%) 8(0.7%)
Structure 214(4.3%) 80(5.1%) 49(4.0%)
Other 615 12.4% 135(8.7%) 47(3.9%)
Engine and landing gear failures/malfunctions dominate both accidents and incidents, with those two
systems accounting for between 48 and 77 percent of all SCFM accidents and incidents. Among accidents
and Part 121 incidents, failures and malfunctions have been more frequent in the engine than in landing
gear, but among Part 135 incidents, landing gear malfunctions occurred more often. No other system
accounted for more than 10 percent of the failure/malfunction accidents or incidents.
The eight "other" systems in Part 121 accidents were as follows: two auxiliary power unit (APU)
malfunctions with fire, two cargo fires, a galley elevator malfunction, the latch failure of a galley door, a
pressurization system malfunction, and an oxygen system leak. A false stall warning was the "other"
system malfunction in Scheduled Part 135, and in Nonscheduled Part 135 the "other" systems were a
vacuum pump, a heater, the anti-ice/de-ice system, and the pressurization system.
For the purpose of further examination, the systems were divided into four groups: engine or fuel
system, flight control or structure, landing gear or hydraulics, and everything else.
Tables VI to VIII detail the specific component (when included in the accident report) that was said to
have failed, fractured, separated, etc. Compilation of this data was dependent upon the phrasing used in
the NTSB report. It must be noted that some reports included more details than others, impacting the
compilation of this data. Also note that some accidents are listed multiple times if multiple malfunctions
occurred.
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TABLE VI.-SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF ENGINE OR FUEL SYSTEM
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Specific parts or components in the
failure/malfunction
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled Part 135
Total engine or fuel SCFM accidents 40 15 124
Accessory drive shaft/ ear 1(2.5%) 3(2.4%)
Beta control linkage 1(2.5%)
Bleed air duct 1(2.5%)
Compressor blade 1(6.7%)
Compressor disk 5(12.5%)
Compressor impeller 1(6.7%)
Compressor stator vane 1(7.5%)
Connecting rod 1(2.5%) 12(9.7%)
Connecting rod bolt/cap/pin
Coupling shaft
1(6.7%) 5 (4.0%)
1(0.8%)
Crankshaft 17(13.7%)
Crankshaft gear bolt/pin 2(l.6%)
Crankcase 4(3.2%)
Engine bull gear 1(2.5%)
Enizine bearin 3(7.5%) 5(4.0%)
Engine cowling/latch 1(6.7%)
Exhaust cam shaft 1(0.8%)
Engine cylinder 1(6.7%) 13(10.5%)
Engine cylinder intake valve 3(2.4-/.)
Exhaust manifold collector 1(0.8%)
Exhaust push rod 1(0.8%)
Exhaust rocker aim 1(0.8%)
Exhaust stack 1(0.8%)
Exhaust valve 1(0.8%)
Fuel leak 2(5.0%) 1(6.7%) 3 (2.4%)
Fuel control 1(2.5%) l(0.8%)
Fuel filter 1(2.5%)
Fuel injection control linkage 3 (2.4%)
Fuel line 1(6.7%) 2(l.6%)
Fuel pump 1(2.5%) 4(3.2%)
Fuel pum2 drive shaft 1(2.5%) 1(0.8%)
Fuel tank 1(0.8%)
Fuel tank float valves 1(6.7%)
Gas producer turbine 1(6.7%)
Ignition system 1(2.5%) 1(6.7%) 3(2.4-/.)
Induction air ducting 2(l. %
Magneto 8(6.5%)
Mixture control linkage 3(2.4 
Loss of oil pressure 1(2.5%) 3 (2.4%)
Oil line 2(l.6%)
Oil pump l(0.8%)
Oil filter gasket 3 (2.4%)
Oil deprivation 1(2.5%) 1(6.7%) 13 (10.5%)
Oil magnetic plug 1(2.5%)
Piston 1(6.7%) 8(6.5%)
Power turbine 1(6.7%)
Propeller blade 1(6.7%) 6(4.8%)
Propeller control unit 1(6.7%) 1(0.8%)
Propeller erosion shield 1(2.5%)
Propeller feathering system 1(0.8%)
Propeller governor control linkage 2(13.2%) 1(0.8%)
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TABLE VI.-Continued
Specific pails or components in the
failure/Inalfunctlon
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Pall
135
Nonscheduled Part 135
Propeller hub assembly 1 5.0% 2(l.6%)
Propeller section 2(l.6%)
Spark plug 5(4.0%)
Throttle control 7(5.6%)
Tluust reverser 2(5.0%) 1 (0.8%)
Timin	 ear 1 (0.8%)
Torsional vibration dam er 1 (0.8%)
Turbine air seal 1(2.5%)
Turbine antirotation nozzle lock 1(2.5%)
Turbine blade 3 (7.5%)
Turbine disk 2 (5.0%)
Turbine hub 1 (2.5%)
Turbine seal 1(2.5%)
Turbocharger 2(1.6%)
Miscellaneous clamp/bolt/seal 3(7.5%) 2(l.6%)
Wiring 1 (2.5%) l(0.8%)
Unknown 3 (7.5%) 7(5.6%)
TABLE VII.-SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF FLIGHT CONTROL OR STRUCTURAL
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Specific pails or components in the
failure/malfunction
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part135 Nonscheduled Part 135
Total flight control or structural SCFM accidents 15 4
1(25.0%)
16
Control yoke
Door locking pin or latch 2(12.5%)
Engine cowling 2(12.5%)
Elevator controls 1(6.7%) 1(6.3%)
Elevator servo tab 2(12.5%)
Elevator trim/tab control 1(6.7%) 1(25.0%) 2(12.5%)
Fuselage skin or structure 2(13.3%)
Horizontal stabilizer 1(25.0%) 1(6.3%)
Inadequate lubrication 1(6.7%)
Jackscrew assembly 1 (6.7%)
Rudder 2(13.3%) 1(6.3%)
Flaps 3(20.0%) 2 12.5%
Slats 2(13.3%)
Taxi light support bracket 1(6.7%)
Window panel 1(25.0%) 1(6.3%)
Wing rib or spar 2(12.5%)
Screws or bolts 2 (13.3%) 1(25.0%)
Unknown 3 (20.0%)
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TABLE VIII.-SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF LANDING GEAR OR HYDRAULIC
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY
Specific parts or components in the failure/inalfwiction
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled Part
135
Total landing ear or hydraulic system SCFM accidents 32 12 71
Brakes 2(6.3%) 8(11.3%)
Brake steering control unit 1(3.1%)
Gear indication system 1 (3.1%) 3(4.2%)
Gear switch 1 (3.1%) 5(7.0%)
Hydraulic actuator 1(1.4%)
Hydraulic check valve 1(3.1%)
Hydraulic fluid loss 8(25.0%) 3(25.0%) 6(8.5%)
Hydraulic line 3(9.4%) 1(8.3%) 3(4.2%)
Hydraulic pump 1(3.1%)
Hydraulic seal 1 (1.4%)
Hydraulic shutoff valve 1(3.1%)
Center gear lower drag brace 1(3.1%)
Main gear axle 1 (1.4%)
Main gear bellcrarrk assembly 3 (4.2%)
Main gear door 2(16.7%) 2(2.8%)
Main gear drag brace 1(3.1%)
Main gear forward trunnion bearing support fitting 1(3.1%)
Main gear drag link 1(1.4%)
Main gear extension/retraction assembly 1(3.1%) 1(8.3%) 9(1.4%)
Main gear locking mechanism 2(2.8%)
Main gear outer cylinder 2(6.3%)
Main gear pivot link l(1.4%)
Main gear pivot shaft 1	 1.4%
Main gear scissor assembly 2(6.3%) 6(12.7%)
Main gear shaft roll pin 1 (1.4%)
Main gear side brace 1(3.1%) 1 (1.4%)
Main gear spring 1 (1.4%)
Main gear strut 3 (9.4%) 10 (14.1%)
Main gear trunnion 1 8.3%
Main gear unspecified 1(3.1%) 2(2.8%)
Miscellaneous bolt 1(3.1%) 1(8.3%) 2(2.8%)
Nose gear actuator 2(16.7%)
Nose gear fork assembly 1(1.4%)
Nose gear link assembly 1(3.1%) 1(1.4%)
Nose gear locking mechanism 1(3.1%) 1(1.4%)
Nose gear retraction cylinder 1	 1.4%
Nose gear seals 1(8.3%)
Nose gear selector valve l(1.4%)
Nose gear steering system 1 (1.4%)
Nose gear strut 1(3.1%)
Nose gear upper lock link 2(6.3%)
Tail-wheel assembly 1 (1.4°%)
Wheel assernbl 1 (3.1%) 1 (1.4%
Table IX shows the number of fatal accidents and total fatalities in each group of the accidents. In
Part 121 accidents, the flight control or structural failures. %malfunctions were the least common but the
most deadly. Landing gear or hydraulic malfunctions were very rarely fatal, regardless of flight operation.
In Nonscheduled Part 135 accidents, the percentages of fatal events were somewhat similar in the three
groups other than landing gear, but lowest in-flight SCFM.
NASA/TM-2010-215808
TABLE IX.—EVENT CHARACTERISTICS BY FAILURE/MALFUNCTION SYSTEM GROUP AND
BY OPERATION CATEGORY
System group Event characteristics
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled
Part 135
Engine or fuel system Total accidents 40 15 124
Fatal accidents 4(10.0%) 3 20.0% 37(29.8%)
Total fatalities 151 33 92
Flight control or structure Total accidents 15 4 16
Fatal accidents 7(46.7%) 1(25.0%) 4(25.0%)
Total fatalities 279 14 4
Landing gear or hydraulic Total accidents
Fatal accidents
Total fatalities
32 12
1 8.3%
71
00
0 5 0
Instruunent, communication,
navigation, electrical, other,
or unknown
Total accidents 22 2 17
Fatal accidents 5(22.7%) 0 6(35.3%)
Total fatalities 347 0 13
Table X shows the level of aircraft damage in each group of the accidents. Landing gear or hydraulic
malfunctions very rarely resulted in aircraft destruction. Of the other three groups, the flight control or
structural failures./malfunctions were the most likely group to result in aircraft destruction among Part 121 and
Scheduled Part 135, but the least likely group to result in aircraft destruction in Nonscheduled Part 135.
TABLE X.—AIRCRAFT DAMAGE BY FAILURE/IvIALFUNCTION
SYSTEM GROUP AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY
System group Aircraft damage
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled
Part 135
Engine or heel system Total accidents
Destroyed
40 15 124
5(12.5%) 3(20.0%) 41(33.1%)
Substantial damage 29(72.5%) 11 73.3% 83 66.9%
Minor damage 1(2.5%) 1(6.7%) 0
No damage 5(12.5%) 0 0
Flight control or structure Total accidents 15 4 16
Destroyed 5 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 4(25.0%)
Substantial damage 10(67.7%) 2(50.0%) 12(75.0%)
Minor damage 0 1 (25.0%) 0
Landing gear or hydraulics Total accidents 32 12 71
Destro ed 0 1(8.3%) 0
Substantial damage 25(78.1%) 11 91.7% 71(100%)
Minor damage 4(12.5%) 0 0
No damage 3 (9.4%) 0 0
Electrical, instrumentation,
communication, navigation,
other, or unknown
Total accidents
Destroyed
Substantial damage
22 2
0
17
7(31.8%) I	 6(35.3%)
4(18.2%) 2 (100%) 11 (64.7%)
Minor damage 4(18.2%) 0 0
No damage 7(31.8%) 0 0
Table XI shows the consequence of the event in each group of the accidents. In Part 121 and
Scheduled Part 135 accidents, the flight control or structural failures/malfunctions were the most likely
group to result in in-flight loss of control. Landing gear or hydraulic malfunctions were the most likely
type to occur with the aircraft on the ground, regardless of operation category. With an engine or fuel
system malfunction or failure, Part 121 flights were most likely to make an uneventful landing, while Part
135 flights were most likely to make a complicated landing.
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TABLE XI.—EVENT CONSEQUENCE BY FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
SYSTEM GROUP AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY
System group Consequence of event
Operation
Part 121 Scheduled Part
135
Nonscheduled
Part 135
Engine or fuel system Total accidents 40 15 124
On ground at time of event 11 27.5% 2(133%) 4(3.2%)
Uneventfid landing 18(45.0%) 1(6.7%) 7(5.6%)
In-flight loss of control 3(7.5%)
8(20.0%)
2(13.3%) 17 (13.7%)
Complicated landing 10(66.7%) 96(77.4%)
Flight control or structure Total accidents 15 4 16
On ground at time of event 1(6.7%) 0 1(6.3%)
UnevendW landing 5(33.3%) 2(50.0%) 3(18.7%)
In-flight loss of control 5 33.3% 1(25.0%) 3(18.7%)
Complicated landing 4(26.7%) 1(25.0%) 9(56.3%)
Landing gear or hydraulics Total accidents 32 12 71
On ground at time of event 20 (62.5%) 4(33.3%) 21 (29.6%)
Uneventful landing 0 1 (8.3%) 0
In-flight loss of control 1 (3.1%) 1 (8.3%) 0
Complicated landing 11	 34.4% 6(50.0%) 50 70.4%
Electrical, instnentation,n
communication, navigation,
other, or unknown
Total accidents 22 2 17
On ground at time of event 7(31.8%) 0 1(5.9%)
Uneventfid landing 9(40.9%) 0 3 (17.6%)
In-flight loss of control 4(18.2%) 0 6(35.3%)
Complicated landing 2(9.1%) 2 (100%) 7(41.2%)
Around 15 to 20 percent of commercial aircraft accidents between 1988 and 2003 involved
malfunctions or failures of some aircraft system or component, and roughly 15 to 20 percent of those
accidents included at least one fatality. In addition, 60 to 70 percent of incidents durin g the same time
period consisted of a system/component failure/malfunction. In Part 121 flights, 21 failures or
malfunctions occurred for each 1 million flight hours; the rate was even higher among Part 135 flights.
Among Nonscheduled Part 135 flights, SCFM accidents occurred most frequently during cruise
flight (31 percent), followed by the landing (22 percent) and takeoff (20 percent) phases. Among
Scheduled Part 135 accidents, the landing and takeoff phases accounted for more than half of the failures
or malfunctions. In Part 121, the largest percentage of SCFM occurred during takeoff (23 percent), but
17.5 percent of the SCFM occurred while the aircraft was standing or during taxi, which is more than 10
percentage points higher than in Part 135. The largest percentage of incidents occurred during cruise
flight, regardless of the operation category (26 to 32 percent).
Less than 25 percent of the SCFM accidents resulted in destruction of the aircraft. One possible
contributing factor is that in-flight loss of control followed only about 12 percent of the SCFM. Among
Part 121 accidents, 65 percent of the failures or malfunctions either occurred while the aircraft was on the
ground or resulted in an uneventful landing, whereas 69 percent of the Part 135 failures or malfunctions
resulted in a complicated landing.
Engine and landing gear failures/malfunctions dominate both accidents and incidents, with those two
systems accounting for between 48 and 77 percent of all SCFM accidents and incidents. Among accidents
and Part 121 incidents, failures and malfunctions have been more frequent in the engine than in landing
gear, but among Part 135 incidents, landing gear malfunctions occurred more often. No other system
accounted for more than 10 percent of the failure/malfunction accidents or incidents.
In general, failures or malfunctions of either the landing gear or hydraulic systems result in less
severe outcomes (fewer fatalities and less aircraft destruction) than other systems. This may be in part
because these malfunctions were the most likely type to occur while the aircraft was on the ground.
Similarly, failures or malfunctions of either the structure or flight control systems result in more severe
outcomes, perhaps because these malfunctions were more likely to lead to in-flight loss of control.
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3.0 Joint Strike Fighter Program
One of the tasks of systems analysis was to use and document data such as true and false positive
rates for detection and diagnosis technologies from JSF and other relevant programs with a goal of
finding useful synergies between the programs. A representative from the IVHM Project systems analysis
team participated in a prognostics and health management Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
consortium to discuss progress of various technologies supported by JSF (Ref. 4). The systems analysis
team has the responsibility to provide critical information to the IVHM management team regarding new
technology trends as they pertain to the stated goal of the IVHM Project (Ref. 1). Representatives from
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and related SBIR companies were also in attendance. Unfortunately, their
research has not progressed far enough to have relevant time and false positive data. However, they have
documented how this data will be collected and analyzed once they reach that point in the development of
their technologies. As technologies are evaluated for their reliability in detection and diagnosis, a panel
will score each individual test event based on a series of criteria and assign a code to the test event based
on the outcome (Ref. 5). This code will document whether the detection or diagnosis was correct, a false
alarm, or another outcome. This process is outlined in a charter document for the Joint Reliability and
Maintainability Evaluation Team (JRMET) and Test Data Scoring Board (TDSB).
4.0 Joint Planning and Development Office
4.1	 Joint Planning and Development Office's National Research and Development Plan
The first version of the R&D for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) was
released by the FAA's JPDO on August 31, 2007 (Ref. 6). The R&D responds to a request from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide a "research and development plan that details the
requirements for needed technologies and identifies the responsibilities of each JPDO member agency
(Departments of Transportation, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, and NASA)" (Ref. 6). The
focus of this first R&D is the fiscal years 2009 to 2013. In the R&D, basic research is defined as
systematic study directed toward fuller knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of
phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications toward processes or products in mind.
Applied research is defined as systematic study for gaining knowledge or understanding necessary to
determine the means by which a recognized and specific need may be met. Finally, development is
defined as systematic application of knowledge or understanding directed toward the production of useful
materials, devices, and systems or methods, including design, development, and improvement of
prototypes and new processes to meet specific requirements.
The research is to focus on procedures, technologies, and automated recovery capabilities to address
the most significant safety issues: loss of control, weather encounters, and mechanical failures.
Specifically the following safer systems outcomes are identified
• Improvement in safety of aircraft, ground systems, and operations
• Reduction in rate of accidents resulting from human error
• Extension of the airworthiness of aircraft where safety is not compromised
The IVHM-related R&D safer systems objective is to "Introduce advanced aircraft and ground
systems to improve health monitoring and mitigate hazards." Table XII shows the research and
development needs identified in the R&D related to the above safer systems objective that will impact
IVHM research plans (Ref. 6).
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TABLE XII.—R-1280 APPLIED RESEARCH ON SYSTEMS HEALTH MANAGEMENT
R-1280 Complete applied research on system health management to support alternative NextGen
e ui a e decisions
Lead agency NASA
NoneSupporting agencies
Required completion date 2015
Supported operational
improvement (OIs)
0I-3008
Agency R&D is aligned.
NASA/ARMD/AVSafedVHNI
FAA—NextGen Research, Engineering and Development
Agency alignment
Agency programs
The objective of the R&D is to "Continuously measure and assess safety through prognostic trend
analysis, coupled with an integrated means of predicting and mitigating risks before incidents or accidents
occur," which is under the outcome related to identifying proactively safety risks. Table XIII shows the
research needs identified in the R&D related to the objective above that will impact IVHM research plans
(Ref. 6).
TABLE XIII.—R-0200 APPLIED RESEARCH ON VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
R-0020 Complete applied research on vulnerability discovery to support an alternatives selection
decision for the NextGen Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
capability
Lead agency NASA
Supporting agencies FAA
Required completion date 2009
Supported operational
improvement (OI)
0I-3004
Agency R&D is aligned.
NASA/ARMD/AvSafe/IVHM
FAA—NextGen System Development-1A13
Agency alignment
Agency program
4.2	 Joint Planning and Development Office Safety Working Group's National Aviation
Safety Strategic Plan
An assessment of the potential impact of the JPDO is continued here through an assessment of the
National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP) developed by the JPDO Safety Working Group. The
purpose of the Safety Working Group is to establish a comprehensive proactive safety management
approach including a shared national aviation safety data reporting and analysis system, and a
comprehensive national-level aviation safety management framework. The NASSP is meant to be a
"living" document and will be updated annually. The NASSP defines national goals, objectives, and
strategies for aviation safety improvements. The plan's workareas provide the basis by which JPDO
member departments and agencies will plan their aviation safety resources and by which the OMB will
align budgets relative to aviation safety. The NASSP was developed and vetted by the JPDO partner
departments and agencies. At the time of this writing, the current version was Version 7 dated August 4,
2008 (Ref. 7).
The NASSP is organized in three goal areas: safer practices, safer systems, and safer worldwide. The
first two goals are being addressed by IVHM Project research tasks. The first goal, safer practices,
emphasizes safety through standards, regulations, and procedures including comprehensive safety
information monitoring, sharing, and analysis for proactive solutions.
The IVHM-related objectives of the Safer Practices Goal are
• Provide consistent safety management approaches that are implemented throughout government
and industry: seeks to improve safety risk management by identifying hazards and analyzing the
risk those hazards pose.
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• Provide enhanced monitoring and safety analysis of the Air Transportation System: focuses on
actively managing risk in the aviation system through a continuous process that monitors and
analyzes data for safety risk.
• Provide enhanced methods for system safety, design certainty, operational procedures, and
training and includes complex system validation and verification processes.
Table XIV summarizes a mapping of the IVHM Project's research to the Safer Practices Goal,
objectives, and strategies.
TABLE XIV.—THE NASSP'S SAFER PRACTICES GOAL, OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES,
AND TASKS RELATED TO NASA IVHM PROJECT RESEARCH
NASSP Objective NASSP Strategy Task Related NASA IVHM
Research
IA) Provide consistent IA3) Improve safety risk 1A3.2) Increase the IVHM 3.1 Detection
safety management management effectiveness of fault IVHM 3.2 Diagnosis
approaches that are management by improving
implemented throughout the detection and diagnostic
government and industry capabilities to increase fault
management
113) Provide enhanced 1B1) hncrease data analysis IVHM 4.3 Discovery in
monitoring and safety for safety risk management Aeronautics Systems Health
analysis of the Air (go beyond traditional causal (DASHlink) Collaborative
Transportation System factor monitoring, use Web site
(ATS) proactive methods to identify
incident and accident
precursors)
1132) Increase Data Analysis 1B2.3) Identify and develop IVHM 1.3 Advanced
for Safety Risk Management tools, methods, and process analytics and complex
systems
1133) Develop prognostic IVHM 3.3 Prognosis
methods to assess risks
1B4) Increase confidence in IVHM 1.4 Verification and
analytical results by Validation
validating the analytic
techniques and the reliability
of results
1C) Provide enhanced 1C2) Advance complex IC2.1) Improve complex IVHM 1.4 Verification and
methods for system safety, system validation and systems requirements Validation
design certainty, operational verification methods in documentation.
procedures, and training support of their certification coimnunications, and
for operational use validation methods for
NextGen
1C2.2) Improve software, IVHM 1.4 Verification and
hardware, operational Validation
procedure, and system
verification methods for
complex systems
The second goal, safer systems, emphasizes implementation of safety-enhancing technologies that
will improve safety through human-centered interfaces and improvements for airborne and ground-based
systems. Included within this goal area is vehicle and ground systems health management.
The IVHM-related objectives of the Safer Systems Goal are
• Provide risk-reducing system interfaces: seeks to ensure the availability of information required
to drive interface concepts.
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Provide safety enhancements for airborne systems: focuses on improving the reliability and
airworthiness of aircraft and improving vehicle systems health management through advanced
monitoring systems and decision aids.
Table XV summarizes a mapping of the IHVM Project's research to the Safer Systems Goal,
objectives, and strategies.
TABLE XV.—THE NASSP'S SAFER SYSTEMS GOAL, OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES,
AND TASKS RELATED TO NASA IVHM PROJECT RESEARCH
NASSP Objective NASSP Strategy Task Related NASA IVHM Research
2A) Provide risk- 2A1) Ensure the 2A1.2) Perform sensor/data analysis IVHM 1.1 Advanced Sensors and
reducing system availability and of information required to drive Materials
interfaces accessibility of interface concepts
required
information
2AIA) Develop sensors and IVHM 1.1 Advanced Sensors and
resentation/interface concepts Materials
2A1.5) Perform real-world IVHM 4.1 Evaluation of
reliability testing and validation of Multidisciplinary IVHM Technologies,
sensors and information Tools, and Techniques
2B) Provide safety 2B1) Improve the 2B1.1) Advance the science of IVHM 1.1 Advanced Sensors and
enhancements for reliability and materials, strictures, and aircraft Materials
airborne systems airworthiness of systems IVHM 1.2 Modeling
aircraft
2131.2) Develop prognostic health IVHM 1.1 Advanced Sensors and
management (PHM) system Materials
concepts for identifying and IVHM 3. 1.1 Baseline assessment of
mitigating system anomalies and detection capabilities
identify advanced sensors, IVHM 3.2.1 Baseline assessment of
integrated sensors, and embedded diagnosis capabilities
sensors IVHM 3.3.1 Baseline assessment of
prognosis capabilities
IVHM 3.4.1 Establish minimum
performance criteria of candidate
mitigation strategies
2B 1.4) Perform flight testing in IVHM 4.1.2 Flight test of detection,
relevant environment diagnosis, and prognosis technologies
for selected adverse event types.
2B2) Improve 2B2.1) Develop PHM systems' IVHM 3.3 Prognosis
vehicle systems design requirements and goals for IVHM 2.1 Aircraft Systems Health
health management all aircraft types Management
through advanced IVHM 2.2 Airframe Health
monitoring Management
systems and IVHM 2.3 Propulsion Systems Health
decision aids Management
IVHM 2.4 Software Health Management
2132.2) Develop PHM system IVHM 3.1 Detection
concepts for identifying and IVHM 3.2 Diagnosis
mitigating system anomalies and IVHM 3.3 Prognosis
identify advanced sensors, IVHM 3.4 Mitigation
integrated sensors, and embedded IVHM 1.1 Advanced Sensors and
sensors Materials
2132.3) Perform simulation and/or IVHM 4.1 Evaluation of
model tests of PHM concepts Multidisciplinary IVHM Technologies,
includes sensors to verify concepts Tools, and Techniques
282.4) Perform flight testing in IVHM 4.1 Evaluation of
relevant environment Multidisciplinary IVHM Technologies,
Tools, and Techniques
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5.0 Future Directions in Aviation Technology as Related To IVHM
The fourth expected outcome of this study is a report providing input on future trends in aviation
technology as documented by at least three conferences. This section contains the results of the literature
survey conducted by NASA to address this expected outcome (Ref. 8). The data used in this report for
identifying and documenting future directions in aviation technology were gathered primarily from the
following four conferences.
• AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit
• AIAA Joint Propulsion Conference
• IEEE Aerospace Conference
• NASA Fundamental Aeronautics Program (FAP) Annual Meeting
Papers from the first three conferences have been reviewed across a 5-yr span (2004 to 2008). Topics
from the last conference were reviewed for the past 2 yr only, since it has only convened since 2007.
Some of the tracks selected for surveying include the topics of silent aircraft initiative, laser propulsion,
microelectrolmechanical (MEMS) electrospray thrusters, plasma actuators, electric propulsion, and
hypersonic flight.
The resulting technologies were classified according to three categories: Propulsion Technologies,
Aeronautics Technologies, and Aircraft Technologies. A total of 21 identified technology trends have
been compiled:
Propulsion Technologies
• Micropropulsion
• Plasma combustion and thrusters
•	 Electric propulsion
• Fusion propulsion
• Laser propulsion
• Spray combustion
• MEMS electrospray thruster
• Nuclear thermal propulsion
Aeronautics Technologies
• Low- and high-altitude airships
• Blended wing body aircraft
• Adaptive wing shape control
•	 Surface effect transports
• Unmanned aerovehicles
• Extreme short takeoff and landing vehicles (ESTOL)
• Supersonic cruise
•	 High-lift concepts
Aircraft Technologies
•	 Silent aircraft
• Distributed power systems for measurement and inspection technologies
• Multifunction structures
• Integrated wireless airplane systems
• Integrated thermal management
While surveying these resources, the aim was to document high-level future aviation trends and
concepts. For the next phase of this project, we will define these technologies in detail. In addition, we
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plan to work with appropriate NASA personnel and other collaborators to further develop technical
expertise in these areas in order to relate them to IVHM topics and assess their potential impact on the
NASA ARMD IVHM Project.
6.0 Current and Future Directions of IVHM-Related Technologies
The fifth and final study outcome is addressed in this section, which details technology trends in
research related to detection, diagnosis, prognosis, and mitigation for IVHM applications. The data used
for identifying and organizing IVHM technologies and trends were gathered primarily from
• Survey results from literature
• JSF Prognostics Health Management System documents (Ref. 9)
• AFRL Advanced Sensor Development for Health Monitoring documents (Refs. 10 and 11)
• Boeing IVHM technologies focus area documents through the Space Act Agreement (SAA)
While surveying these resources, we aimed both at documenting the state of the art in current IVHM
technologies, including those employed by major military and commercial platforms (JSF PHM program,
the U.S. Air Force, and Boeing), and at identifying potential technologies for future aerospace
applications.
The organizational scheme followed here, however, can be redefined depending on the future needs
of both the IVHM Project and the broader IVHM community. In fact, similar studies in the literature have
adopted varying organizational schemes for documentin g future technologies and developing technology
roadmaps. To give an example, Boeing organizes technology focus areas based on major subsystems and
components of an aircraft and include new and emerging technologies listed under Propulsion IVHM,
Environmental Control, Electronics IVHM, Electrical Power Systems, Batteries, Wiring, Landing Gear,
Electromechanical Actuators, Hydraulic Actuators, Fuel Systems, and Generators. Similarly, JSF PHM
and other relevant AFRL programs have their own organizational schemes for organizing IVHM-related
technologies.
When identifying these technologies, a distinction between current and emerging technologies has not
been made. Although this distinction can be made, the difference is subtle in light of all the documents
reviewed. It often depends on the maturation level of a specific technology and the objectives of the
program it is used in. A combined list of current and emerging technologies for IVHM has been provided.
The resulting technologies are classified according to 8 categories with a total of 34 current or
emerging technology areas:
• Measurement and Inspection Technologies
– Acoustic emission
– Induced positron annihilation
– Robust laser interferometer
– Eddy current inspection
– Thermography
– Time domain reflectometry
– Stress wave analysis
Sensor Technologies
– MEMS devices
– Eddy current
– Corrosion
– Surface acoustic wave
– Tomography
– Fiber optics
– Silicon carbide
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– Solid state vacuum
– Thin film (ceramic)
– Piezoelectric materials
– Microwave blade tip
• Sensor Management Technologies
– Distributed smart sensor network
– Adaptive energy harvesting
• Detection Technologies
– Piezoceramic crack
– Foreign object damage (FOD)
• Component and Subsystem Monitoring Technologies
– Gas path debris
– Blade harmonics (vibration)
– Wiring
– Solder joint fatigue modeling and monitoring
• Diagnosis Technologies
– Distributed and agent-based diagnostics
– Fuzzy reasoning
• Prognosis Technologies
– Actuator
– Electronics
– Bearing
– Prognostic fusion
• Mitigation Technologies
– Arc fault prevention
– Selective fault reporting
For additional information regarding these technologies, including descriptions of the technology and
literature references, see Reference 5.
7.0 Discussion and Conclusions
Around 15 to 20 percent of commercial aircraft accidents between 1988 and 2003 involved
malfunctions or failures of some aircraft system or component, and roughly 15 to 20 percent of those
accidents included at least one fatality. In addition, 60 to 70 percent of incidents during the same time
period consisted of a SCFM.
Less than 25 percent of the SCFM accidents resulted in destruction of the aircraft. One possible
contributing factor is that in-flight loss of control followed only about 12 percent of the SCFM. Among
Part 121 accidents, 65 percent of the failures or malfunctions either occurred while the aircraft was on the
ground or resulted in an uneventful landing, whereas 69 percent of the Part 135 failures or malfunctions
resulted in a complicated landing.
Engine and landing gear failures/malfunctions dominate both accidents and incidents, with those two
systems accounting for between 48 and 77 percent of all SCFM accidents and incidents. Among accidents
and Part 121 incidents, failures and malfunctions have been more frequent in the engine than in landing
gear, but among Part 135 incidents, landing gear malfunctions occurred more often. No other system
accounted for more than 10 percent of the failure/malfunction accidents or incidents.
In general, failures or malfunctions of either the landing gear or hydraulic systems result in less
severe outcomes (fewer fatalities and less aircraft destruction) than other systems. This may be in part
because these malfunctions were the most likely type to occur while the aircraft was on the ground.
Similarly, failures or malfunctions of either the structure or flight control systems result in more severe
outcomes, perhaps because these malfunctions were more likely to lead to in-flight loss of control.
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The IVHM Project research technologies were found to map to the Joint Planning and Development
Office's National Research and Development Plan (R&D) as well as the Safety Working Group's
National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP). The IVHM Project is related to two R&D safer system
applied research objectives: applied research on systems health management, and applied research on
vulnerability discovery. All four levels of the IVHM Project's Technical Plan can be directly linked to
five objectives contained within the safety systems and safety practices goals of the NASSP.
Future directions in Aviation Technology as related to IVHM were identified by reviewing papers
from three conferences across a 5-year timespan. A total of 21 trend groups in propulsion, aeronautics,
and aircraft categories were compiled.
Current and future directions of IVHM-related technologies were gathered through a survey of
literature, Joint Strike Fighter Prognostics Health Management System documents, AFRL Advanced
Sensor Development for Health Monitoring documents, and Boeing IVHM technology focus area
documents. The resulting technologies were classified according to eight categories: measurement and
inspection, sensors, sensor management, detection, component and subsystem monitoring, diagnosis,
prognosis, and mitigation.
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Appendix A.—Acronyms
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
APU auxiliary power unit
ARMD Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
AvSafe Aviation Safety Program
ATS Air Transportation System
DASHlink Discovery in Aeronautics Systems Health Collaborative Web site
ESTOL extreme short takeoff and landing
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAP Fundamental Aeronautics Program
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FOD foreign object damage
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IVHM Integrated Vehicle Health Management
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office
JRMET Joint Reliability and Maintainability Evaluation Team
JSF Joint Strike Fighter
MEMS microelectromechanical devices
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASSP National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OI operational improvement
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PHM prognostics health management
R&D Research and Development Plan (JPDO)
SAA Space Act Agreement
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research
SCFM system/component failure/malfunction
TDSB Test Data Scoring Board
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